Conclusion
The box gives a logical plan for reducing junior doctors' hours. The changes in hospital service required to bring their hours back to realistic levels will need to be radical. However, they are long overdue and provide a tremendous opportunity to improve the service far beyond the issue of junior doctors' hours. In our two previous papers we discussed the use of measures of health related quality of life in clinical trials and in describing the health of populations.' " We now turn to the difficult issue of using quality of life measures for allocating limited resources among competing health care programmes. We concentrate on the quality adjusted life year (QALYs) since this approach has received most attention. QALYs use an index combining changes in survival and quality of life of patients (and possibly others) to assess benefit brought about by the funded programme. For each programme this benefit can be divided by its economic cost and the resulting ratio used to help allocate resources. QALYs can be used to choose between alternative programmes for treating the same patients or, more controversially, to choose among programmes targeted at different groups.
The underlying philosophy is that rationing of resources is inevitable and so it is best that it is explicit and accountable. 3 To ration effectively some measures of output from health care must be established. However, it is important to distinguish between such general issues, with which most may agree, and the actual techniques used in published studies, which have been greatly criticised. For example, Williams describes a method to assess current life expectancy and quality of life in which quality of life is assigned a value "q" on a 0 to 1 scale, 1 representing perfect health and 0 representing death. 4 Each future year is then counted as worth q, with the possibility of discounting the value of future years in a similar manner to that used for future costs. The total QALYs for the group are estimated with and without the intervention, and the difference between the two estimates is a single composite measure of the marginal output of the programme.
Williams emphasised the possible role of QALY analysis in the marginal allocation of additional resources, and North Western Regional Health Authority made an early unsuccessful attempt at allocating its discretionary specialties revenue reserve fund to its district health authorities.5 However, district health authorities are now considering such schemes6 at a more basic level, and in at least one case serious attempts are being made at implementation.7 In this article we focus on British applications, although the most extreme example of a QALY type analysis is that attempted in Oregon.8 Here 714 condition treatment pairs were placed in rank order and Oregon proposed to fund them from the Medicaid budget according to those ranks; the future of this project is now, however, in doubt.
The QALY analyses arouse strong opinions. Critics have questioned the assumptions underlying the procedure, doubted the quality of the data for calculations, raised ethical objections concerning equity, and questioned whose values were relevant and whether it is reasonable to compare different numbers of different groups of people by a single index.9'-4 Supporters of the QALY approach have said that current examples of QALY analysis are not definitive, that the method is still in development, and that it is intended only as an aid to decision making rather than a strict recipe. '5-'7 The lack of an alternative procedure has also been emphasised. '6 To clarify the arguments below we identify the stages necessary to introduce a QALY system for resource allocation. We discuss whether progress from stage to stage is technically feasible or ethically desirable, and conclude with some recommendations for the appropriate future role of QALY type analyses.
Adopting a formal approach to resource allocation Allocating scarce resources among competing health care programmes requires judgment about best use. The box gives the stages between extreme positions of completely informal judgment and rigid adherence to a formula.
Few would propose intuition unaided by explicit information concerning costs and benefits as an ideal method of allocating resources but it describes much of current practice ( This supports the argument of Carr-Hill that including death on a scale forces choices that cannot be realistically considered by subjects, making them reluctant to answer and their responses rather arbitrary.9'23 For Euroqol subjects were asked to mark various states of health on a "thermometer" between best possible (100) and worst imaginable (0) states of health. Among the 21 % providing usable responses in a Swedish study,24 the median score for death was 0, while being anxious or depressed was placed at a median of 75. The consequences of such an assessment will be explored later.
In contrast, Rosser et al use a hierarchical approach which largely avoids direct comparisons with death.2' From this can be derived a "disutility" specific to any positive response in the questionnaire, each being subtracted from 1 to obtain a final global measure of quality of life. However, the model contains strong assumptions925 which can lead to implausible weights It's difficulty to apply quality of life measures to laboratory and other services BMJ VOLUME 305 14 NOVEMBER 1992 Stages in developing QALY analysis -for example, in a reported sample, feeling a lack of ambition was assigned 45% more disutility than complete bowel incontinence.' Both the Rosser index and Euroqol rely on ratings provided by the general public. Such population values may not reflect those of patients in general, let alone those of the patient whose treatment will be influenced." In particular, healthy younger people may have an inappropriate view of what is important to elderly people.26 Although various surveys may be used for information, the decision making body must decide on the appropriateness of the values used and the sensitivity of the conclusions.
Survival analysis
Since length of survival cannot be predicted with certainty, any measure of survival benefit is essentially an average of survival distributions (stage 6). The steps within the standard QALY analysis are (a) estimate the survival distribution for patients with and without intervention, (b) value each future year according to a fixed discount rate, (c) calculate change in discounted life expectancy, (d) add up over the group.
We make the major assumption that if validated data on quality of life and survival are collected the first step can be achieved. The second step reflects the perception that years in the distant future are not worth as much as the immediate future, although a suitable discount rate is the subject of considerable controversy (box). Figure 2 shows the discounted life expectancy for average women of different ages derived from life tables for England and Wales.3' Clearly older people do not have the capacity for benefit" of younger people, in that they can hope to achieve only a limited number of QALYs no matter how effective the intervention is; this has led to the accusation that the QALYs are agist.'4 While a low or zero discount rate will favour services aimed at the young, figure 2 shows that this differential will be almost eliminated by substantial discounting.
Any summary measure of a survival distribution, of which discounted life expectancy is only one choice, reflects a value judgment.'6 A possible altemative is to express gain in life expectancy as a fraction of that for an average person of the same age. Thus an expected gain of 12 life years for a 20 year old would be equivalent to a gain of three life years for a 70 year old, since each is about 20% of the life expectancy. This measure also reflects the perception that a person's value of a year may depend strongly on context.32
Adoption of such a measure would tend to favour treatment for elderly people.
Simple addition of benefit in each person is in one sense egalitarian, in that everyone is weighted equally, and summarising by a cumulative output reflects the utilitarian philosophy underlying QALY analysis. Alternatively, a deontological approach emphasises the right of each person to care, and would not aggregate and rank groups according to their potential benefit. With this view everyone is given good (but not necessarily the greatest) treatment, thus saving lives rather than lifetimes.'4"6 The standard QALY approach may be egalitarian, but it does not encourage equity,9" it is possible to stay within the QALY approach but invent a means of aggregation that reflects differing perspectives-for example, weighting individuals differently '6-although seem to be at stake. Firstly, in options 1 and 2 the patients are similar to start with but while one option guarantees a small benefit for all, the second envisages large variation among patients. Uniformity of benefit also makes option 3 seem attractive. Option 2 also shows the problems in trading off mortality and quality of life: did those who rated anxiety or depression at q= 0-75 realise that this could be used to justify such a high operative mortality? Similar examples have been discussed within the context of clinical trials. 29 The second aspect of equity concems the numbers and initial health of patients in each option: should resources be concentrated on the patients who can benefit most? A simplistic QALY analysis could obscure such issues rather than clarify them.
If we change the discount rate to 0%, we obtain QALY benefits for options 1 to 4 of 15, 30, 15, and 57 respectively, greatly favouring interventions with possible long term consequences. A discount rate of 10% gives scores of 15, 10, 15, and 8, thus representing strong aversion to risk of early death. While this example is clearly highly stylised, it shows that QALY analyses can be extremely sensitive to discount rate, and that suitable quality of life assessments for trade off of mortality and morbidity are difficult to obtain. Indeed, all such rankings will probably provoke disagreements, partly because a person's value structure is unlikely to obey the simplifying assumptions underlying the usual quality adjusted life year analysis. 22 More importantly in a QALY analysis quality of life values are aggregated over uncertainty, over time, and over groups of differing size to produce a single measure, and it is implausible that any values whatever the assessment procedure, can then give rise to appropriate consequences. 33 Some have argued that many such objections could be avoided by making the procedure more elaborate.'63435 For example, to deal with accusations that maximising QALYs leads to a Thatcherite preference for the fortunate,'4 Wagstaff has suggested a non-linear "social welfare function" in which, for example, a gain from 1 to 2 QALYs is worth more than a gain from 10 to 11.36 Other equity considerations could be explicitly built into measures of output. But from the perspective of quality of life, there remains the crucial point that the means of assessing values from individuals does not reflect the use to which they will be put, and hence could give rise to the kind of dubious conclusions described above. If quality of life values are constructed rather than measured, then elicitation should be couched directly in terms of realistic, although necessarily simplified, resource allocation decisions.
The 
Conclusions
The poor state of information management within the NHS will make even validated data collection difficult. At the same time, it may be appropriate to explore QALY analyses when considering resource allocation within programmes-for example, in setting priorities within a waiting list for kidney transplants, in which there is a disease specific outcome measure, a homogeneous population, and groups of different sizes and composition are not being compared. The issues are then similar to those faced in a clinical trial, in which there are still problems in aggregating quality and length of life.32 In particular, we question the appropriateness of current techniques for exploring values to be placed on quality of life measures that include death and believe such valuations should be elicited within the context of resource allocation decisions.
Even if reasonable population valuations on quality of life can be obtained, formal comparison of different patient groups is fraught with difficulties. Dowie suggests first making a political decision on how much should be spent in different areas of health care, and using careful QALY type analyses within these areas3; possible categories might be research and development, prevention, chronic care, and acute services. Not having to make explicit trade offs between such categories avoids many of the difficulties identified above, while still encouraging an accountable analysis within each area.
Buxton rightly states that any QALY analysis is inevitably a simplification,35 but the crucial issue is whether this will lead to unwise or unfair decisions. The possibility of misleading results arising from an apparently "scientific" procedure is not just a technical problem that can be solved by yet larger surveys but requires continual public scrutiny of what lies behind each step in the development of composite outcome measures. Any formal approach must clarify rather than obfuscate the issues, and this would seem to require that decision makers retain direct control over the aggregation of basic outcome data. While we strongly recommend that attempts are made to progress to higher stages of decision making, elaborate calculations are, in our view, not 
